Bediuzzaman’s Views on Ijtihad

 

By Mustafa Baktir*

 

I. Definition of Ijtihad and Conditions of Being a Mujtahid

 

A. What is Ijtihad?

The word ijtihad is derived from the root jahd, meaning exerting oneself to obtain something. In this context, it is a mujtahid exerting himself to the utmost in order to make a ruling of the Shari‘a from specific evidences. If we analyze this definition, the following elements emerge:

(1) One who exerts himself to understand a ruling of the Shari‘a being a mujtahid.

(2) A mujtahid exerting himself to grasp the matter thoroughly.

(3) This exertion should be in order to understand the injunctions of the Shari‘a and those pertaining to actions.

(4) Ijtihad being carried out according to particular principles and by deduction from specific evidences.

It is therefore not ijtihad to learn a question from books or by asking scholars.

The mujtahid is someone who has the ability to carry out ijtihad, and fulfils all the necessary conditions. The conditions are as follows:

 

B. The conditions for being a Mujtahid

1) Knowledge of Arabic: Before everything the mujtahid has to have a thorough knowledge of the styles, eloquence, and subtleties of the Arabic language. For the two chief sources of Islam, the Qur’an and Sunna, are in Arabic.

2) Knowledge of the Qur’an: The Qur’an being the main source of religion, he should know it all generally, and have more detailed knowledge of the verses related to the injunctions (ahkam) of jurisprudence (fiqh), and he should be acquainted with all their finer points.

3) Knowledge of Hadiths: Since the Hadiths of God’s Messenger (PBUH) are the second main source of Islamic law, they are part of the mujtahid’s area of interest. He should know not only the content of the Hadiths, but the degrees of their soundness.

4) Knowledge of the injunctions about which there is consensus (ijma’): The mujtahid should know the questions about which the scholars of fiqh have reached consensus and should be extremely careful not to pass any judgements opposed to them. For it is not permissible to carry out ijtihad on any question about which there is consensus.

5) Knowledge of the principles of fiqh: In order to carry out ijtihad on a question, he should know the evidences of the Shari‘a and their order of precedence. He can know the meaning of the words and their order of precedence only through knowledge of this science.

6) Knowledge of the aims of the Shari‘a: Shatibi (d. 790/1388) in particular emphasized the importance of this condition, which means understanding the aims and purposes of the Shari‘a. This is the first and most important of the two conditions that have to be fulfilled by the mujtahid.1

7) The ability to carry out ijtihad: The mujtahid has to possess the accurate perception, innate capacity and mental clarity necessary to make precise and swift decisions. If he lacks the capacity, he cannot be a mujtahid even if he fulfills the other conditions.

8) Good intention and sound belief: Imam Ghazzali (d. 505/1111) stated that for the fatwa (ruling) of a mujtahid to be acceptable, he had firstly to be just, of good character, and righteous. A ruling given by a person lacking those qualities is not acceptable.2 Bediuzzaman laid down the condition for those who carry out ijtihad of their having “perfect taqwa” and the intention “to conform to the essentials of religion.”3

 

II. Is the Door of Ijtihad Open or Closed?

 

One of the questions debated most in connection with ijtihad is whether or not any century can be without a mujtahid. It is expressed as “Khuluw al-asr min al-mujtahidin,” and sometimes discussed in terms of whether or not the gate of ijtihad is open. Although some scholars of fiqh have asserted that since the fourth century of the Hijra the gate of ijtihad has been closed, there have been others who have stated that it will be open till the Last Day. I want firstly to give the different views of the scholars, and then describe the points Bediuzzaman makes and his analyses.

 

A. Those who say that no century can be without its mujtahid

According to one group of scholars, it is not possible for any century or age to be without a mujtahid. Imam Suyuti (d. 911/1505) held this view, and wrote an independent work as a refutation of those who opposed it.4 The following Hadith forms the proof for those supporting this view:

“One group of my Umma will persist in the truth. Those who oppose them will be unable to harm them. Finally God’s command will be given while they are in that state.”5

 

B. Those who say that some centuries may be without mujtahids

According to another group of fiqh scholars, it is permissible for any century to be without a mujtahid, as actually happened. Although Shawkani (d. 1250/1832) said that Imam Ghazzali and Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d. 606/1209) were of this view,6 I could find nothing to confirm it their books. We see that the Shafi‘i Sayfuddin al-‘Amidi (d. 631/1233), the Hanifis Ibn al-Humam (d. 861/1457), Ibn Amir al-Hajj (d. 879/1475) and other fiqh scholars held this view too.7 Their evidence for this is the following Hadith, related by ‘Abdullah b. ‘Amr:

“Once Almighty God has bestowed knowledge on you, He will not forcibly take it from you. But He will take the scholars from within society together with their knowledge. Then matters will remain to an ignorant group. The people will ask them concerning their religious needs, and replying in accordance with their personal opinions and wishes, they will lead the people astray, and they too will be in misguidance.”8

The reason for this view was the anarchy in the issuing of rulings and carrying out of ijtihad from the third century onwards, and was given as the explanation for the ruling that the door of ijtihad had been closed.9

 

C. Shatibi’s view

The interpretation of Shatibi, who introduced new methods in the science of the principles of fiqh, differed to the above. In his view, ijtihad was of two sorts:

The First was the ijtihad which will continue till the Last Day. It is not possible for this ijtihad to cease before that happens. Ijtihad of this sort consists of defining whether or not a primary matter or reason (‘illa) is present exactly in secondary matters, and is known as tahqiq al-manat. For example, in the Qur’an, Almighty God says: “And take for witness two persons from among you, endued with justice...”10 There is need to establish who possesses the attribute of ‘justice,’ the limits of which are specified by the Shari‘a. This attribute starts with Abu Bakr and continues to people of much lower degree. One has to expend all one’s power to establish whether or not it is found in someone. It is natural that all judges, Muftis, and anyone authorized even, can perform ijtihad of this sort. For someone authorized, even if they are illiterate, may decide whether or not any unstipulated action made mistakenly while performing the obligatory prayers has invalidated the prayers, or whether or not it is excusable.11

The Second: To come to the ijtihad that may cease to be practised in time; it is of three sorts:

a) Tanqih al-manat: This is the differentiation from other attributes by means of ijtihad of an attribute which is basic to the making of a ruling. In some Qur’anic verses and Hadiths, the attribute which is possibly the primary matter or reason is mentioned jointly with others. The primary matter has to be differentiated by means of ijtihad from those that have been abrogated.

b) Takhrij al-manat: Here, there is no indication or explanation concerning the primary matter or reason in the verses or Hadiths which define the ruling. The primary matter or reason has to be established in various ways through ijtihad.

c) A second sort of the tahsqiq al-manats mentioned above, which is a more subtle and profound matter. This too may cease.12

 

D. Bediuzzaman Said Nursi’s view

Bediuzzaman’s view and evaluation of this question is somewhat different. He maintains that the door of ijtihad is open, but at the present time there are a number of obstacles preventing it being entered.

1. The increase of innovations in the Islamic world: According to Bediuzzaman, on a stormy day in winter one blocks up small holes, let alone opening up new doors. To try to open up holes in a wall in order to repair it while it is threatened by the full force of a flood, is likely to cause it to be washed away. Bediuzzaman continues:

“In just the same way, at this time of denial and the assault of the customs of Europe and the legion of innovations and the destruction of misguidance, to open up new doors in the citadel of Islam in the name of ijtihad, and make openings that will be the means of those bent on destruction scaling the walls and entering it, is a crime against Islam.”13

2. The essentials of religion being in danger: According to Bediuzzaman, at the present time, the fundamentals of religion are in danger. In any event, there is no need for ijtihad in these basic matters. Religion cannot exist without them. The essentials of religion should therefore be firstly established and revived. Moreover, the ijtihads carried out by early scholars can meet our needs in many matters. Bediuzzaman says that to leave them aside and carry out new ijtihad is therefore “an innovation and a betrayal of Islam.”14

3. The environmental factor in raising mujtahids: On looking at human history, we see that every century some things have been sought after and that people have expended all their strength to obtain them. According to Bediuzzaman, in the age of the righteous first generations of Islam, the thing most sought after was as follows:

“... Deducing from the Word of the Creator of the Heavens and the Earth His wishes and what He wants of us were the most sought-after goods, and obtaining the means to gain through the light of prophethood and the Qur’an, eternal happiness in the world of the hereafter, which had been revealed to such a degree it could not be concealed.”15

Bediuzzaman described as follows the environmental factor in raising mujtahids in the times near the era of the Prophet (PBUH):

“At that time, since minds, hearts and spirits were turned with all their strength to understanding the wishes of the Sustainer of the Heavens and the Earth, the discussions, conversations, events, and circumstances of man’s social life all looked to that. Since they occurred in accordance with those wishes, whoever had high ability, his heart and nature unconsciously received instruction in knowledge of God from everything. He received knowledge from the circumstances, events, and discussions that took place at that time. As though everything became a teacher for such a person, and inculcated in his nature and disposition the preparatory knowledge for independent judgements. That natural instruction illuminated him to such a degree that he was almost capable of interpreting the law without acquiring the knowledge, to be illuminated without fire... Thus, when someone capable who received such natural instruction in this way began to work at interpreting the law, his capacity which had become like a match manifested the mystery of Light upon Light; he became qualified to interpret it (mujtahid) swiftly and in a brief time.”16

However, due to the awesome moral and spiritual pollution of the present day, it does not appear possible to find an environment conducive to raising mujtahids. Bediuzzaman gives three main reasons for this: a) the domination of European civilization over Muslims; b) the supremacy of naturalist philosophy; and c) the conditions of life becoming more difficult. Because of these, people’s minds have become scattered, their endeavour stifled and solidarity broken, and their minds have become alienated from spiritual matters. The people of the present, who have grown up in such an environment, are in need of ten times longer to reach the level of the mujtahids of the early period.17

4. Ijtihad should not be forced, but within the natural course of things: There is an inclination to grow and expand in all bodies. Since it is natural, it moves towards perfection, like the growth and development of a tree and its starting to produce fruit. However, if this expansion is from without, it leads to the body’s destruction and annihilation. Bediuzzaman applies the same comparison to ijtihad:

“... when the inclination to expand and will to interpret the law were present in those within the sphere of Islam through the door of perfect taqwa and the way of conforming to the essential teachings of Islam, like the righteous early generations, that was a perfection and a being perfected. But if such an inclination and desire come from those who give up the essentials, prefer the life of this world to that of the hereafter, and are tainted by materialist philosophy, it is the means of destroying the body of Islam and casting off the chain of the Shari‘a from the neck.”18

5. Distance from the Age of Bliss: The great mujtahids, who belonged to the early generations of Islam, were close in time to the Companions of the Prophet, and receiving a pure light, were able to carry out ijtihad. But those of the present are distant from that age, and can therefore see even the clearest matters only with difficulty.19

Bediuzzaman discussed these ideas in specific sections in the Twenty-Seventh Word, which he called Ijtihad Risalesi (Treatise on Independent Judgements of the Law [Ijtihad]). We may list as follows the chief obstacles to ijtihad, taken from both the above treatise and other parts of the Risale-i Nur:

6. The domination of European civilization and atheistic Western philosophy over Muslims.

7. Increased difficulties in making a livelihood.

8. The fact that at the present time the questions of fiqh are considered from the point of view of wisdom and benefit, not that of the reason (‘illa). Although the wisdom is taken into account, the ruling should not be based on it, but on the reason.

9. The life of this world is now the centre of everyone’s attention, while the life of the hereafter remains in second place.

10. Misunderstanding of the principle of ‘necessity,’ which is a means of facilitating things.20

 

III. The Practice of Ijtihad in the Form of Consultation

 

Bediuzzaman suffered greatly at the plight of the Islamic world during the period of the Ottoman collapse, and from time to time set out his ideas in the press, and produced solutions for its problems. In his view, the Shaykh al-Islam’s Office, which represented the Caliphate in Istanbul, should be an institution not only for Istanbul and the Ottomans, but for the whole Islamic world. In its ineffectual state at that time, it was incapable of guiding Istanbul, let alone the vast world of Islam. It should be made such that it could gain the confidence of the Islamic world and perform its function towards them satisfactorily.21

Bediuzzaman indicates that with the changing times, rulings may change, and the reason ijtihad should be in the form of consultation:

“We are not in the old times now. Formerly, a single individual ruled, and the ruler’s mufti could also be a single individual who corrected and modified his ideas. The present, however, is the time of the social collectivity. And the ruler is an unemotional, stern collective personality, which is somewhat deaf and emerges from the spirit of the collectivity.”

Bediuzzaman says that the Mufti has need of such a council in order to make what he says accepted by the people. For an individual is merely like a mosquito before the collective personality of a community. He attributes to “the weakness and ineffectiveness of the Shaykh al-Islam’s Office” the “weakness of religion, indifference towards the marks of Islam, and anarchy in ijtihad” that was then afflicting society. Then the pronouncements of the Shaykh al-Islam proceeding from such a council could make even the greatest genius give up his ijtihad, and a consensus could be obtained in many matters.

All those qualified can interpret the law (ijtihad), but such ijtihad becomes a guiding principle only when confirmed by consensus or is accepted by the majority of the ‘ulama. A Shaykh al-Islam whose rulings (fatwa) emerge from such a council, would reflect the meaning of this. In Islamic law, actions should primarily be in accordance with the view of the majority. At the present time, in the face of the anarchy of opinions, there is overwhelming need for such measures. The council could be set up either in Istanbul, the centre of the Caliphate, or somewhere else if necessary.

Bediuzzaman says that although a number of infrastructural preparations should first be made, like “the organization of the Islamic community” and “the taking over of the pious foundations (evkaf) by the Shaykh al-Islam’s Office,” these may also done afterwards. He says too that the matter may be performed indirectly by the deputies [of the National Assembly], but it would be only indirectly. “But a purely Islamic council is necessary to undertake this vast duty directly and primarily.”22 It should not be forgotten here that there were also non-Muslim deputies in the Assembly. Bediuzzaman says too:

“... the Darü’l-Hikmeti’l-Islâmiye, which was founded for an important purpose, should be raised from the level of an ordinary commission. It should be deemed the natural member of the council together with the chiefs of the departments of the Shaykh al-Islam’s Office, and for now fifteen or twenty eminent scholars who have won the confidence of Islam, both religiously and morally, should be attracted from the Islamic world abroad. This forms the basis of this weighty question.”23

On 16th April, 1916, Bediuzzaman was writing a Qur’anic commentary in Arabic entitled Isharat al-I’jaz (Signs of Miraculousness), while fighting against the Russians in the mountains of Pasinler near Erzurum during the First World War. In the introduction to the work, he emphasizes that a successful Qur’anic commentary can be written only by an elevated committee the members of which are specialists in various sciences.24

He put forward the same idea in the following lines from his versified work Lemeât, which he wrote and published while a member of the Darü’l-Hikmeti’l-Islâmiye:

“It is consensus and the majority (cumhur) which receives the [ratifying] stamp of the Shari‘a. The primary condition for calling [others] to an idea is the acceptance of the mass of the people. The call is otherwise innovation, and to be rejected. It gets stuck in the mouth, never to re-emerge...”25

In Emirdag Lahikasi, in which Bediuzzaman collected together the letters he had written between 1949 and 1952, he set out in slightly clearer form the question discussed in the [Turkish] translation of the introduction to Isharat al-I’jaz (Signs of Miraculousness), which he had written years before, showing that he persisted in this idea of forty years previously. He wrote:

“... Everyone may deduce his own rulings and act according to his ijtihad (so long as his own whims do not interfere), but they cannot be a proof for others, unless some sort of consensus confirms the ruling. It is most necessary that in order to apply the injunctions of the Shari‘a, and to set them in order and execute them, and in order to dispel the anarchy arising from freedom of thought, there is an elevated committee made up of investigative scholars, which, having gained the confidence of the masses as well as that of the majority of the ‘ulama, is a sort of implicit guarantee and defence lawyer for the Umma, and manifests the mystery of the proof of the consensus of the Umma. Then, through the consensus, the result of ijtihad may become a principle [recognized by] the Shari‘a, and through the confirmation and stamp of the consensus, embrace everyone...”26

Moreover, we learn from some sources that Imam A‘zam, Abu Hanifa (150/767), the founder of the Hanafi School, debated a question that had been asked of him with a group of forty students in order to reach the level of ijtihad, and had it written down.27

Moreover, at the present time we see that many people who have written works on Islamic law have been of the opinion that ijtihad of this sort is more appropriate for today’s conditions.28

 

IV. Miscellaneous Matters Related to Ijtihad

 

A. The ijtihad of one mujtahid does not bind another

Bediuzzaman states that if a person who fulfils the conditions to carry out ijtihad does so, his ijtihad is binding only on himself; he cannot force others to conform to it. His opinion is in conformity with the Shari‘a, but it is not the Shari‘a. He may be a mujtahid, but he cannot be musharri‘, that is, the one who lays down the Shari‘a.29

Furthermore, a mujtahid is not bound to follow (taqlid) another mujtahid.30 As it says in a Hadith,31 if he is correct in his ijtihad, he receives two rewards, while if he is not correct, he still receives one reward, for his effort.32

 

B. The changing of Shari‘as according to the age

1. The Shari‘a changing according to the age

According to Bediuzzaman, the schools of law emerged because of differences in understanding of the theoretical principles shown by God, the Owner of the Shari‘a. The principles known as the essentials of religion and incontestable matters can never be changed in any way. Anyone who does change them has renounced religion.33 He explains Shari‘as changing according the ages as follows:

“Sacred laws change according to the ages. For in one age a number of different prophets may come, and they have come. Since subsequent to the Seal of the Prophets, his Greater Shari‘a is sufficient for all peoples in every age, no need has remained for different laws. However, in secondary matters, the need for different schools has persisted to a degree. Just as clothes change with the change of the seasons and medicines change according to dispositions, so sacred laws change according to the ages, and the ordinances change according to the capacities of peoples. Because the secondary matters of the ordinances of the Shari‘a look to human circumstances...”34

Then he gives the sociological reasons for the change of Shari‘as like this:

“At the time of the early prophets, since the classes of men were far apart, and their characters both somewhat coarse and violent, and their minds, primitive and close to nomadism, the laws at that time came all in different forms in ways appropriate to their conditions. There were even different prophets and laws in the same continent in the same century. Then, since with the coming of the Prophet of the end of time, man as though advanced from the primitive to the secondary stage, and through numerous revolutions and upheavals reached a position at which all the human peoples could receive a single lesson and listen to a single teacher and act in accordance with a single law, no need remained for different laws, neither was there necessity for different teachers.”35

 

2. The wisdom in the emergence of different schools of law

Since despite all these developments, mankind had not all reached the same level, the schools of law emerged. From the social point of view, if all mankind had been at the same level, the schools of law could have united. But since this has not been possible, they have not united. Bediuzzaman illustrates the differences between the schools of law, although the truth is one, as follows:

“The same water governs in five different ways in five ill people of different disposition, thus: for one, the water is a cure for his illness, and according to medicine, necessary. For another, it is like poison for his sickness and harmful, and medically prohibited. For another, it causes a small amount of harm, and is reprehensible medically. For another the water is beneficial and without harm; according to medicine that is Sunna for him. And for yet another it is neither harmful nor beneficial; he can drink it with good health, and for him it is medically permissible. Thus, here the truth has become numerous; all five are true. Are you able to say: ‘The water is only a cure, only necessary, and it governs in no other way.’”36

Like in this example, the Divine injunctions change from one school of law to another, but they are all right and good. People who follow the Shafi‘i school tend to be peasants and nomads to a greater extent than followers of the Hanafi school, the majority of whom are town-dwellers and civilized. This sociological fact was influential in the emergence of different rulings concerning worship and human relations.37

 

C. The necessity of returning to the Qur’an

Bediuzzaman stated that:

“It is the sacredness of the source that drives the mass of people to conform [to the precepts of religion]. The books of those qualified to interpret the law (mujtahidin) should be like means and display the Qur’an as though they were glass; they should neither act on its behalf nor obscure it.”38

Bediuzzaman continues:

“If the Qur’an had been shown directly in the essentials of religion, the mind would naturally have realized its sacredness, which is the rouser of the conscience, the essential precedent, and urges conformity [to the precepts of religion]. In this way, the heart would have become sensitive towards it, and would not have remained deaf to the admonitions of belief.39

“That is to say, while the books of the Shari‘a should all have been transparent like glass, in the course of time they became tarnished due to the errors of imitators, obscuring it like a veil. Yes, although these books should have expounded the Qur’an, they became like literary compositions.”40

Bediuzzaman says that there are three ways attracting the people’s gaze directly to the Qur’an, and describes these in turn:

“There are three ways of directing the attention of the mass of people to the Qur’an, which is the exemplification of the Pre-Eternal Address, shimmers with the attraction of miraculousness, has a halo of sacredness, and constantly stirs the conscience through belief:

1. Either the deep respect which the authors truly deserve should be destroyed through criticism, and that veil removed. But that is dangerous, unfair, and tyrannical;

2. Or, by means of a gradual, specialist training, to transform the books of the Shari‘a into transparent Qur’anic commentaries and show the Qur’an within them, like the works of the early interpreters of the law (mujtahids), like the Muwatta and Fiqh al-Akbar. For example, when a person looks at Ibn Hajar, he should do so in order to understand the Qur’an and learn what the Qur’an says, not in order to understand what Ibn Hajar said. This second way needs time;

3. Or, like the sufis, to direct the ordinary peoples’ gaze above the veils obscuring it and show the Qur’an; to seek its pure, unmixed property from the Qur’an itself, and only its secondary decrees from the means. The sweetness and attraction of a sufi shaykhs’ sermon in relation to a sermon given by a scholar of the Shari‘a stems from this.”41

Bediuzzaman concludes his views on returning to the Qur’an like this:

“If the essential religious needs of the Islamic community had been sought from the Qur’an itself, that Perspicuous Book would have been the object of a demand greater than that divided up between millions of book because of need, and in this way would have been dominant and influential over people in the full meaning. It would not have been only something ‘holy’ that was recited for the merit.”42

The question of reverting to the Qur’an is still discussed extensively in the Islamic world and our own country, and works are written about it and symposia held. However, these are generally in the form that Bediuzzaman did not recommend, of criticizing the ‘ulama of former times. In the question of returning to the Qur’an, as in many other matters, the ideas Bediuzzaman put forward years ago in Ottoman times, are truly apt and balanced.

 

Conclusion

Bediuzzaman’s ideas on ijtihad were original to himself and corresponded to the conditions of the day. In his view, although the door of ijtihad is open, there are certain obstacles to entering it at this time. He did not leave the idea at that, he analyzed the present social and economic conditions of Muslims from various points of view and offered proof and evidence for his findings. He was also of the opinion that some of the problems of Muslims at this time could be better solved through discussion of a qualified group in the form of consultation. Bediuzzaman’s discussions and analyses of the position of the Qur’an, the chief source of the Shari‘a, the reasons for the emergence of the schools of law, and other matters related to ijtihad, are truly striking.

 

*Prof. Dr. MUSTAFA BAKTIR

Professor Mustafa Baktir was born in Kayseri in 1952. He graduated from the Faculty of Islamic Sciences in Erzurum University, and was then appointed an Assistant in Islamic Law in the same faculty. In 1982 he received his Ph.D., in 1988 he was appointed Doçent, and in 1994, Professor. He continues to teach in the same faculty, and at the same time is Director of Erzincan Islamic College. Among his published works are: Ashab-i Suffa, Islam Hukukunda Zaruret Hali.

 

FOOTNOTES

1. Shatibi, Ibrahim b. Musa, al-Muwafaqat fi Usul al-Shari’a, Egypt, iv, 105-6.

2. Ghazali, Abu Hamid Muhammad, al-Mustasfa fi ‘Ilm al-Usul, Egypt 1324, ii, 350.

3. Nursî, Bediüzzaman Said, Sözler, Istanbul, Sözler Yayinevi 1960, 451 / The Words [English trans.], Sözler Publications 1993, 496.

4. Suyuti, Jalal al-Din ‘Abd al-Rahman, Kitab al-Radd ‘ala Man Akhlada Ila’l-Radd, Beirut 1983, 97; Shawkani, Muhammad b. ‘Ali, Irshad al-Fuhul, Beirut, 222; Ibn Badran, ‘Abd al-Qadir b. Ahmad, al-Madkhal, Dar Ihya’u’l-Turath al-‘Arabi, 191; al-Zuhayli, Wahbi, Usul al-Fiqh al-Islami, Damascus 1986, ii, 1070; Karaman, Hayreddin, Islâm Hukukunda Ictihad, Ankara 1975, 183.

5. Bukhari, Tawhid, 29, viii, 189; al-I’tisam, 10, viii, 149; Muslim, al-Imara, 170, No: 1920; Tirmidhi, Fitan, 51; Ibn Maja, Muqaddima, 1.

6. Shawkani, Irshad al-Fuhul, 223.

7. al-Amidi, Sayf al-Din ‘Ali b. Abi ‘Ali, al-Ihkam fi Usul al-Ahkam, Cairo 1968, iv, 202-3; Ibn al-Humam, Kamal al-Din Muhammad, al-Tahrir fi’l-Usul (tog. with al-Taqrir wa’l-Tahbir), Beirut 1983, iii, 336; al-Ansari, Muhammad b. Nizam al-Din, Fawatih al-Rahamut, Egypt 1324, 399.

8. Bukhari, al-‘Ilm, 34; al-I’tisam, 7, viii, 148; Muslim, al-‘Ilm, 13, No: 2673; Tirmidhi, al-‘Ilm, 5; Ibn Maja, Muqaddima, 8; Darimi, Muqaddima, 26.

9. Sha’ban, Zekiyüddin, Islâm Hukuk Ilminin Esaslari [Turk. trans: I. Kafi Dönmez], Ankara 1990, 378.

10. Qur’an, 65:2.

11. Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat, iv, 89-93.

12. Ibid., 95 ff.

13. Sözler, 449 / The Words, 495.

14. Sözler, 450 / The Words, 496.

15. Sözler, 450 / The Words, 496.

16. Sözler, 450 / The Words, 496.

17. Sözler, 450 / The Words, 496.

18. Sözler, 451 / The Words, 497.

19. Sözler, 452-3 / The Words, 499.

20. Sözler, 450-1 / The Words, 496-7.

21. Nursî, Bediüzzaman Said, Sünûhat, Istanbul 1977, 37-8. (This work was first published in Istanbul in 1338/1922).

22. Sünûhat, 38-9.

23. Sünûhat, 40.

24. Nursî, Bediüzzaman Said, Isârâtü’l-I’caz, Istanbul 1993, 8.

25. Sözler, 658.

26. Nursî, Bediüzzaman Said, Emirdag Lahikasi, Istanbul 1959, ii, 89.

27. Hamidullah, Muhammed, Imam-i Âzam ve Eseri [Turk. trans: Kemal Kuscu], Istanbul 1963, 37-9.

28. See, ‘Ali Hasabullah, Usul al-Tashri’ al-Islami, Egypt 1971, 108; Khalaf, ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Masadir al-Tashri’ al-Islami, Kuwait 1970, 13; Karaman, Hayreddin, Islâm Hukukunda Ictihad, 234-5.

29. Sözler, 657.

30. Nursî, Bediüzzaman Said, Muhâkemat, Istanbul 1977, 42.

31. Bukhari, al-I’tisam, 21, viii, 157; Tajrid al-Sahih, xii, 411.

32. Nursî, Bediüzzaman Said, Mektûbat, Istanbul 1964, 50 / Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, Letters 1928-1932, Istanbul, Sözler Publications 1994, 74.

33. Mektûbat, 407 / Letters, 544.

34. Sözler, 454 / The Words, 500.

35. Sözler, 454 / The Words, 500-1.

36. Sözler, 454 / The Words, 501.

37. Sözler, 455 / The Words, 501-2.

38. Sünûhat, 31.

39. Sünûhat, 32. See also, Sözler, 656.

40. Sünûhat, 32. See also, Sözler, 656.

41. Sünûhat, 32-3.

42. Sünûhat, 34.